From a review by David Papineau, professor of the philosophy of science at King's College, London of a book titled, 'Karl Popper -- The Formative Years, 1902-1945' by Malachai Haim Hacohen, 'who teaches history at Duke University'.
<Popper's standing must rest on his philosophy of science, ... and his account of science is fundamentally flawed. It can seem plausible to view science as a succession of brave conjectures and honest refutations. But few philosophers today think that this explains the worth of science. The whole point of science is to provide a trustworthy guide to the future, not a series of hopeful guesses. Hacohen recommends Popper's critical rationalism over the poststructuralist relativism that dominates so much of the modern academy. But, behind the stylistic differences, there is little to choose between the two philosophies, for both deny that it is possible to identify the truth...
But where the others continued to learn, develop and in time exert a lasting influence on the philosophical tradition, Popper knew better. He refused to revise his falsificationism, and so condemned himself to a lifetime in the service of a bad idea. >
Note the word 'trustworthy' in 'The whole point of science is to provide a trustworthy guide to the future, not a series of hopeful guesses.' And what would the future be to a historical science?
Doesn't it sometimes seem to you that (hard) sciences like paleontology are included in these discussions by analogy, rather than as an essential example?