[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index][Subject Index][Author Index]
Re: Disparaging Popper
<By definition,this means depending in large part on inductuve reasoning and
on statistical analysis of data. Quite bluntly, even Aristotle knew that
this was fallacious
2400 years ago...
Bayesianism is more to their liking becasue it commits the probabalistic
fallacy: what is likely to be true MUST
be true. This elevates their conjectures to dogma and gives their opinions
absolute authority in science.>
and from your other posting:
<In both cases [inductive as in experimental sciences and deductive as in
historical sciences] one can only have confidence about scientific theories
within certain limits of probability.>
I think you're saying that statistical probability analysis does not yield
'truth' about reality, but can be used to evaluate hypotheses.
To paraphrase (sorry if I'm mis-stating), if certainty is measured by
statistical confidence, 100% certainty is not possible. But if that's true,
then in fact no scientific theory can refute or preclude the accuracy of any
alternative theory. (I'm using the word theory in place of hypothesis on
purpose.) One theory may be only more likely than another based on arguable
criteria. That proposition is troublesome.
The original book review said:
<The whole point of science is to provide a trustworthy guide to the future,
not a series of hopeful guesses. Hacohen recommends Popper's critical
rationalism over the poststructuralist relativism that dominates so much of
the modern academy. But, behind the stylistic differences, there is little
to choose between the two philosophies, for both deny that it is possible to
identify the truth.>
Someone arguing that 'truth' is tentative and subjective and socially
derived would not be inconvenienced by a confidence-based approach, no?