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Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma



A BRIEF COMMENT:
Evolutionary game/bifurcation theory, and the
prisoner's dilemma (combined with flocking/swarming
behaviour, predator-prey dynamics, etc.), are, to be
sure, important components of any discussions of
pre-K/T behavioural strategies, and the prisoner's
dilemma is a marvellous pivot for investigatory
speculations. Most published works on game theory have
excellent elucidations of the prisoner's dilemma.
Two excellent templates:
M.J. Crawley, ed., 1992. Natural enemies: the
population biology of predators (Blackwell
Scientific), 576pp
L.A. Dugatkin & H.K. Reeve, eds., 1998. Game theory
and animal behavior (Oxford University Press), 320pp
To the list of Timothy Killingback's papers, one can
add:
Timothy Killingback & Michael Doebeli, 1996. Spatial
evolutionary game theory: hawks and doves revisited.
Proc. Royal Soc. London B263:1135-1144
Timothy Killingback & Michael Doebeli, 1998.
Self-organized criticality in spatial evolutionary
game theory. Jour. Theoretical Biology 191(3):335-340
Kurt Brauchli, Timothy Killingback, Michael Doebeli,
1999. Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured
populations. Jour. Theoretical Biology 200(4):405-417
Timothy Killingback & Etienne Studer, 2001. Spatial
ultimatum games, collaborations, and the evolution of
fairness. Proc. Royal Soc. London B268:1797-1802
The 1999 paper "Raise the stakes" evolves into a
defector, has an interesting reply by T.N. Sharratt
and Gilbert Roberts.
*******************************************************

--- "Jaime A. Headden" <qilongia@yahoo.com> wrote:
> New in _The American Naturalist_:
> 
>   Killingback, T. and Doebeli, M. 2002. The
> continuous prisoner's dilemma
>   and the evolution of cooperation through
> reciprocal altruism with
>   variable investment. _The American Naturalist_ 160
> (4): 421-438.
> 
>   You think the title explains it all? Flowery? No.
> Concepts on the
> development of cooperation in organisms have
> involved largely behavioral
> models that have never been corroborated or
> mathematical experiments that
> indicate probabilities of results. Essentially, the
> paper involves the
> prisoner's dilemma (hereafter referred to as PD) and
> an essential "game"
> method of determining how the origin of cooperation
> can be observed. PD is
> essentially a paradox, a conflict between altruism
> and selfishness. To any
> individual during the evolution of life, selfishness
> has been the primary
> focus in survival, basic Darwinian concept of
> survival of the fittest; it
> is therefore most advantageous to an individual to
> be selfish. Yet still,
> cooperative groups have developed over several
> methods (detailed in the
> paper and referencesd further) in spite of this
> selection advantage to the
> selfish creature; cooperative associations increases
> the benefit over
> multiple people versus a single individual, and
> permits families, for
> sake, to persist versus one individual. PD is
> intriguing because it
> supports the selfish scenario, and indicates selfish
> creatures will cause
> any cooperators to be eliminated from the field.
> 
>   It works like this:
> 
>   There are two players, the prisoners. There are
> two attitudes, C for
> cooperator, and D for defector; there are four
> playable states: T for
> temptation to cheat, R for reward for cooperation, P
> for punishment for
> defecting, and S for cooperating against your
> opponent, or the sucker's
> payoff. Each state has a value resulting in the
> following series: T > R >
> P > S, depending on individual benefit. In this, the
> first player is
> assumed to play the defector (D), and thus would
> pick T > R, and P > S.
> But so is the second player. The authors described
> mathematical
> perambulations that permit a different outcome with
> the same basic design,
> building on the same principles and data, which I
> will not go into too
> much detail; furthermore, their results include
> mathematical models that
> permit a cooperative system to arise from a selfish
> one, and permit any
> organism to become cooperative. This draws upon
> previous models including
> the "tit for tat", "generous tit for tat", and
> "pavlov" systems, each
> which permit the players to be able to eventually
> arrive at a cooperative
> state, but with constant checks to affirm outcomes.
> The authors introduce
> the "continuous iterative prisoner's dilemma" which
> is itself a solution
> that does not require any checks, and as the title
> states, it is based on
> reciprocal altruism not dependant on continuous
> investment, but will
> arrive at the end state no matter the investment. It
> a great paper, the
> title grabbed me because of recent discussion on
> cooperative hunting, and
> I ended up not being able to put it down. Other more
> accessible papers are
> available on the web or can be garned with help (I
> have provided links to
> each item):
> 
>   Cited paper above:
> 
>   Killingback, T. and Doebeli, M. 2002. The
> continuous prisoner's dilemma
>   and the evolution of cooperation through
> reciprocal altruism with
>   variable investment. _The American Naturalist_ 160
> (4): 421-438.
>
(http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AN/journal/issues/v160n4/020011/brief/020011.abstract.html
> - URL may be clipped, but you may just need to go to
> the
>   root site
> http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AN/journal/ and
> search from
>   there)
> 
>   Doebeli, M. and Knowlton, N. 1998. The evolution
> of interspecific
>   mutualism. _Proceedings of the National Academy of
> Sciences, USA_ 95:
>   8676-8680.
>   (http://www.math.ubc.ca/~doebeli/publications.html
> or
>   
>
http://www.zoology.ubc.ca/~alistair/z/faculty/doebeli.html
> - scroll
>    down, the authors provide a pdf)
> 
>   Killingback, T. and Doebeli, M. 1999.
> Raise-the-stakes evolve into a
>   defector. _Nature_ 400: 518.
>   (http://www.math.ubc.ca/~doebeli/publications.html
> or
>   
>
http://www.zoology.ubc.ca/~alistair/z/faculty/doebeli.html
> - scroll
>    down, the authors provide a pdf)
> 
>   Killingback, T.; Doebeli, M.; & Knowlton, N. 1999.
> Variable investment,
>   the continuous prisoner's dilemma, and the origin
> of cooperation.
>   _Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B_
> Biological Sciences 266
>   (1430): 1723-1728.
>   (http://www.pubs.royalsoc.ac.uk/ - you will have
> to access the journal
>   listings to the appropriate journal, then
> archives, then go to volume
>   266 and find the listed issue, it will not allow
> me to link the URL, as
>   it is not given)
> 
>   Cheers,
> 
> =====
> Jaime A. Headden
> 
>   Little steps are often the hardest to take.  We
> are too used to making leaps in the face of
> adversity, that a simple skip is so hard to do.  We
> should all learn to walk soft, walk small, see the
> world around us rather than zoom by it.
> 
> "Innocent, unbiased observation is a myth." --- P.B.
> Medawar (1969)
> 
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