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RE: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation

Agree David. If its not about evolution/ dinosaurs, it's about anything

militaristic. Me .. I've always been into ICBMs and naval parahpenalia [sic ?].

I think it has more to do with game tactics 'n strategy. When you get this

deep, you become frustratingly aware why big powers get into such big

messes over such little incidences. International military strategies are

still abysmally 19th C [like my spelling .. damn it]

> Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 21:12:42 -0700
> From: ddkrentz@charter.net
> To: tholtz@umd.edu
> CC: r.sookias@gmail.com; dinosaur@usc.edu
> Subject: Re: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation
> Did Greg fire the fire shot of the post media frenzy shrink ray?
> It always tickles me that so many Dinosaur guys are also military 
> hardware/history guys. Must be something about BIG things. Me, I’ve always 
> been a WW2 tank guy.
> D
> On Sep 8, 2014, at 2:09 PM, Thomas R. Holtz, Jr. <tholtz@umd.edu> wrote:
>> Yes. It is more "Ye Olde English" [sensu RenFaire speak]), not "Old English"
>> Thomas R. Holtz, Jr.
>> Email: tholtz@umd.edu Phone: 301-405-4084
>> Office: Centreville 1216 
>> Senior Lecturer, Vertebrate Paleontology
>> Dept. of Geology, University of Maryland
>> http://www.geol.umd.edu/~tholtz/
>> Fax: 301-314-9661 
>> Faculty Director, Science & Global Change Program, College Park Scholars
>> http://www.geol.umd.edu/sgc
>> Fax: 301-314-9843
>> Mailing Address: Thomas R. Holtz, Jr.
>> Department of Geology
>> Building 237, Room 1117
>> University of Maryland
>> College Park, MD 20742 USA
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: owner-DINOSAUR@usc.edu [mailto:owner-DINOSAUR@usc.edu] On Behalf Of 
>>> Roland Sookias
>>> Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 5:08 PM
>>> To: Dinosaur Mailing List
>>> Subject: Re: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation
>>> I'm not going to comment on anything helpful or biological here, but I feel 
>>> it must be mentioned (as I was infuriated by it) that
>> the
>>> etymology section erroneously also states that the word "Dreadnought" (or 
>>> perhaps the words "dread" and "nought", depending
>>> how you read it) is from Old English.
>>> Whilst the precursors of these words existed (as "adrædan" and "nawiht") in 
>>> Old English (a language which was replaced by Middle
>>> English around 1100), "dread" and "nought" as spelt today were first used 
>>> in Middle English, and obviously both words continue to
>> be
>>> used in Modern English (with quite a different pronunciation), though use 
>>> of "nought" for "nothing" has stopped.
>>> Thus at the earliest it could be called Middle English, and Early Modern or 
>>> archaic Modern English (depending when this usage of
>>> "nought" became entirely poetic) would probably be more like it.
>>> On 8 September 2014 16:00, Ben Creisler <bcreisler@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Oops. Wrong subject line.
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: <GSP1954@aol.com>
>>>> Date: Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 5:50 AM
>>>> Subject: Please forward this to dinolist too
>>>> To: bcreisler@gmail.com
>>>> In a message dated 9/7/14 2:23:16 AM, tijawi@gmail.com writes:
>>>> << I found GSP's post very interesting. However, it is worth noting
>>>> that, from a historical perspective, the name _Dreadnoughtus_ is
>>>> perhaps more appropriate than GSP made out. The archetypal dreadnought
>>>> (HMS Dreadnought, launched 1906) was a product of the naval arms race
>>>> between Great Britain and Germany prior to World War I. The
>>>> Dreadnought was part of a broader British strategy of deterrence - the
>>>> importance of having a large, powerful and technologically advanced
>>>> fleet to reinforce Great Britain's superiority at sea, rather than
>>>> deploying warships as a decisive military force. Under First Sea Lord
>>>> Fisher, the role of the British war fleet was intended to be mostly
>>>> defensive - to protect the homeland; guard the British Empire's
>>>> strategic ports; and enforce a naval blockade against Germany should
>>>> war break out. As it turned out, the greatest sea-born threat to
>>>> Great Britain during World War I turned out to be German U-Boats and
>>>> their unrestricted warfare against enemy and neutral shipping. It was
>>>> this that ultimately helped draw the United States into World War I.
>>>> The above analysis is correct. And I am not particualrly opposed to
>>>> applying dreadnought to sauropod names. It was the way in which
>>>> Lacovara et al did so, incl in PR in the science media, that is not in
>>>> accord with history.
>>>> Had
>>>> I reviewed the paper I would have done something about that. And the
>>>> mass estimates.
>>>> In a message dated 9/7/14 3:42:44 PM, design@starfleetgames.com writes:
>>>> << Everybody had battleships before 1906, but they tended to have two
>>>> or four big guns for long-range pot-luck sniping a lot of medium-sized
>>>> guns to do the real dirty work up close. The term battleship had
>>>> actually been in use for centuries and applied to what we moderns call
>>>> "ships of the line".
>>>> Nelson called them "Line of Battle Ships" or simply "battleships."
>>>> There was even a wooden battleshp called Dreadnought in the 1700s.
>>>> The continuing and steady improvement in gunnery, optics, and other
>>>> mechanical sciences meant that long-range gunnery had reached the
>>>> point that it might actually work. Several nations started building a
>>>> new kind of battleship, the "all-big-gun" battleship. The trick was,
>>>> nobody knew what one looked like because nobody had ever seen one. The
>>>> first to start construction was the USS South Carolina and her sister
>>>> the USS Michigan.
>>>> Everybody else was starting this new kind of ship, independenty, on
>>>> their own.
>>>> Britain, German, Italy, Russia, all had plans in hand or keels on the
>>>> slipway.
>>>> The British started HMS Dreadnought somewhat later, but built it much
>>>> faster, so it was the first all-big-gun-battleship in service.
>>>> Dreadnought was a very bad design. It had all big guns, but because
>>>> the British couldn't figure out how to have Turret #2 shoot over
>>>> Turret #1, only eight of the ten cannons could shoot right or left,
>>>> and there was not much in the way of internal compartments (another
>>>> new idea) so a torpedo hit was going to be sudden death overtime. It
>>>> did have the new kind of modern turbine engines.
>>>> USS Michigan came out next, and it had four double gun turrets with #2
>>>> shooting over #1 (on the front) and #3 shooting over #4 (on the back)
>>>> so with only eight guns it had the same firepower as Dreadnought (8 vs
>>>> 8). It had internal compartments, turbines, and was superior to
>>>> Dreadnought in every way, BUT, Dreadnought was first so now
>>>> "dreadnought" is interchangable with "battleship"
>>>> when it shouldn't be. HMS Dreadnought was so bad that the British
>>>> never sent it into battle and quickly copied Michigan. Maybe you'd
>>>> call it a "loss leader"
>>>> to "capture the brand name."
>>>> So now we just need a dinosaur called Michigandus magnificus and we'll
>>>> be historically accurate.>>
>>>> I have some disagreements with the above.
>>>> The predreadnoughts of the late 1890s and very early 1900s generally
>>>> had two main battery turrets, one fore and one aft, twins mounting 4
>>>> guns of
>>>> 11 or
>>>> 12" bore, with a bunch of 6 or 8" guns astride the superstructure.
>>>> Athough the main guns were modern rifles able to fire very long
>>>> ranges, the fire control systems were lacking so battles were intended
>>>> to be at a few thousand meters, with the possibility of ramming with
>>>> the ram bows -- but during the Russo-Japanese war the predreadnoughts
>>>> sometimes banged away at one another at greater ranges. The tubby
>>>> batships were also slow at about 18 kts.
>>>> Lord Fischer wanted to markedly increase the power of the battle fleet
>>>> while keeping costs down, and with the same number of ships. How to do
>>>> that?
>>>> Obvious. Double the broadside of heavy guns while not increasing
>>>> tonnage all that much (already nervous about a radical new design that
>>>> would obsolesce the predreadnought force, Parliament was not about to
>>>> pay for much bigger ships), which required getting rid of the
>>>> intermediate guns. There was also talk of how a large set of all heavy
>>>> guns would also make long range gunnery possible because their uniform
>>>> ballistics would allow long range over-under salvo spotting, but the
>>>> required technology was not yet on hand. Fisher also took the
>>>> opportunity to do what he liked best and increase speed to 21 kts via
>>>> the brand new turbines, a concept he took further with the equally big
>>>> battlecruisers which were not as bad as many think they were.
>>>> The Dreadnought itself and 6 semi-sister ships had five turrets with
>>>> two on the wings because that allowed it in principle to fire three
>>>> turrets forward as the fleet charged -- ram bows generating
>>>> magnificent bow waves
>>>> -- at
>>>> short range directly at the enemy. In reality the blast of the side
>>>> turrets was so intense that they could only fire broadside, which soon
>>>> became a problem because only 4 turrets could engage in the preNelson
>>>> line of battle that the Royal Navy and everyone else readopted in the
>>>> late 1900s going into the Great War.
>>>> (The Germans also initially used wing turrets, even more inefficiently
>>>> in their first dreadnoughts. The RN gradually and awkwardly went
>>>> superimposed, the Neptunes had one aft, with central turrets actually
>>>> meant to fire through the superstructure when needed -- kind of crazy
>>>> but the Invincibles did that at the Falklands to the discomfort of
>>>> those in the the opposite turrets.
>>>> They did not remount the sighting hoods on the turrets tops so upper
>>>> gun sets could not fire straight forward or aft over the lower turrets
>>>> during WW 1, but they did not care because by then the line of battler
>>>> was back in vogue.
>>>> The USN immediately went to efficient superimposed turrets as per the
>>>> Michigans. )
>>>> As the war approached systems were developing to allow long range fire
>>>> under central control, eventually using salvo techniques especially by
>>>> the Brits
>>>> - its a very complicated story of competing systems being applied
>>>> semi-haphazardly to differing vessels at differing times that I have
>>>> never fully sorted out -- but their whimpy rangefinders reduced their
>>>> ability to initially find the range. Over all the gunnery was fairly
>>>> equal at Jutland, Beatty's battlecruisers had initial problems because
>>>> they were not able to conduct gunnery practise at Rosyth, and also had
>>>> worse back lighting conditions during the run south. By the end of the
>>>> war the Grand Fleet had the world's best long range systems, but the
>>>> problems were not really solved until high frequency, broad scan
>>>> phased array radars atop the main range finders allowed RN and USN
>>>> batships to straddle fast moving targets at ranges up the max of 20
>>>> plus miles (the 3 old batships with the new system immediately
>>>> straddled the poor Yamashiro at Suriago Straight when they opened fire
>>>> at 10 miles at night).
>>>> Of course the 3 Brit batcruisers blew up at Jutland with virtually all
>>>> crews lost because the RN was using dangeorusly unstable cordite
>>>> charges (still doing that in 41 when the fast battleship she was NOT a
>>>> battlecruiser Hood went poof), not because of inadequate armor -- at
>>>> Dogger Bank, Jutland and the final battle of the Bismarck the Germans
>>>> were having their turrets taken out by the often heavier RN guns left
>>>> & right without the ships blowing up because they used a very stable
>>>> cordite formula that flash burned (killing all in the magazines and
>>>> turrets, like what happened on the Iowa in 89) rather than immediately
>>>> exploded. Same for the Americans, so the USS Boise took an AP round in
>>>> a magazine during a Solomons night battle and stayed in the action
>>>> with the three forward turrets burned out (that is the other reason
>>>> that the Arizona's exploding so quickly still has them scratching
>>>> their heads).
>>>> Had the Brits who were running an oceanic empire paid proper attention
>>>> to their ammo, i. e. had stable cordite and AP rounds that actually
>>>> worked most of the time (the shells were too brittle and the primitive
>>>> fuses rarely worked), Jutland would have been a significant RN
>>>> victory, with no major Grand Fleet losses and probably 3-4 High Seas
>>>> Fleet batcruisers sunk. Oh well.
>>>> It is correct that the RN, in part because of habitability issues for
>>>> ships sent to distant empire stations, did not pay sufficient
>>>> attention to underwater protection, unlike the Germans and Americans.
>>>> That is why the new super dreadnought Audacious sunk after hitting
>>>> just one mine, along with inadequate damage control early in the war,
>>>> and detail problems ("watertight" doors jarred open by the initial
>>>> shock, etc). But the similar Marlborough took a torpedo in engineering
>>>> at Jutland and maintained its place in the battle line (we can imagine
>>>> its Scotty keeping the steam up despite the pressure).
>>>> The Dreadnought was with the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow until she was
>>>> assigned with ye old predreadnoughts to defend the Thames outlet. So
>>>> the Dreadnought herself alas missed the colossal battle of Jutland she
>>>> inspired. Shortly after that she rejoined the Grand Fleet -- the 6
>>>> other oldest dreadnoughts in Jellicoe's fleet hardly being different
>>>> in design. She did ram and sink a pesky sub at one point.
>>>> As it happens I have a criticism of USN WW 2 torpedoes in the Sunday
>>>> Washington Post --
>>>> http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/more-on-alexandrias-torpedo-factor
>>>> y-and-a-soviet-leader-who-did-shop-at-giant/2014/09/06/b89e43ba-3436-1
>>>> 1e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
>>>> GSPaul
>>>> </HTML>