[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index][Subject Index][Author Index]

Re: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation

Ben Creisler

A new (lower) estimate of the weight of Dreadnoughtus...


On Tue, Sep 9, 2014 at 10:56 AM, dale mcinnes <wdm1949@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Agree David. If its not about evolution/ dinosaurs, it's about anything
> militaristic. Me .. I've always been into ICBMs and naval parahpenalia [sic 
> ?].
> I think it has more to do with game tactics 'n strategy. When you get this
> deep, you become frustratingly aware why big powers get into such big
> messes over such little incidences. International military strategies are
> still abysmally 19th C [like my spelling .. damn it]
>> Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 21:12:42 -0700
>> From: ddkrentz@charter.net
>> To: tholtz@umd.edu
>> CC: r.sookias@gmail.com; dinosaur@usc.edu
>> Subject: Re: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation
>> Did Greg fire the fire shot of the post media frenzy shrink ray?
>> It always tickles me that so many Dinosaur guys are also military 
>> hardware/history guys. Must be something about BIG things. Me, I’ve always 
>> been a WW2 tank guy.
>> D
>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 2:09 PM, Thomas R. Holtz, Jr. <tholtz@umd.edu> wrote:
>>> Yes. It is more "Ye Olde English" [sensu RenFaire speak]), not "Old English"
>>> Thomas R. Holtz, Jr.
>>> Email: tholtz@umd.edu Phone: 301-405-4084
>>> Office: Centreville 1216
>>> Senior Lecturer, Vertebrate Paleontology
>>> Dept. of Geology, University of Maryland
>>> http://www.geol.umd.edu/~tholtz/
>>> Fax: 301-314-9661
>>> Faculty Director, Science & Global Change Program, College Park Scholars
>>> http://www.geol.umd.edu/sgc
>>> Fax: 301-314-9843
>>> Mailing Address: Thomas R. Holtz, Jr.
>>> Department of Geology
>>> Building 237, Room 1117
>>> University of Maryland
>>> College Park, MD 20742 USA
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: owner-DINOSAUR@usc.edu [mailto:owner-DINOSAUR@usc.edu] On Behalf Of 
>>>> Roland Sookias
>>>> Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 5:08 PM
>>>> To: Dinosaur Mailing List
>>>> Subject: Re: Dreadnoughtus weight calculation
>>>> I'm not going to comment on anything helpful or biological here, but I 
>>>> feel it must be mentioned (as I was infuriated by it) that
>>> the
>>>> etymology section erroneously also states that the word "Dreadnought" (or 
>>>> perhaps the words "dread" and "nought", depending
>>>> how you read it) is from Old English.
>>>> Whilst the precursors of these words existed (as "adrædan" and "nawiht") 
>>>> in Old English (a language which was replaced by Middle
>>>> English around 1100), "dread" and "nought" as spelt today were first used 
>>>> in Middle English, and obviously both words continue to
>>> be
>>>> used in Modern English (with quite a different pronunciation), though use 
>>>> of "nought" for "nothing" has stopped.
>>>> Thus at the earliest it could be called Middle English, and Early Modern 
>>>> or archaic Modern English (depending when this usage of
>>>> "nought" became entirely poetic) would probably be more like it.
>>>> On 8 September 2014 16:00, Ben Creisler <bcreisler@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> Oops. Wrong subject line.
>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>> From: <GSP1954@aol.com>
>>>>> Date: Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 5:50 AM
>>>>> Subject: Please forward this to dinolist too
>>>>> To: bcreisler@gmail.com
>>>>> In a message dated 9/7/14 2:23:16 AM, tijawi@gmail.com writes:
>>>>> << I found GSP's post very interesting. However, it is worth noting
>>>>> that, from a historical perspective, the name _Dreadnoughtus_ is
>>>>> perhaps more appropriate than GSP made out. The archetypal dreadnought
>>>>> (HMS Dreadnought, launched 1906) was a product of the naval arms race
>>>>> between Great Britain and Germany prior to World War I. The
>>>>> Dreadnought was part of a broader British strategy of deterrence - the
>>>>> importance of having a large, powerful and technologically advanced
>>>>> fleet to reinforce Great Britain's superiority at sea, rather than
>>>>> deploying warships as a decisive military force. Under First Sea Lord
>>>>> Fisher, the role of the British war fleet was intended to be mostly
>>>>> defensive - to protect the homeland; guard the British Empire's
>>>>> strategic ports; and enforce a naval blockade against Germany should
>>>>> war break out. As it turned out, the greatest sea-born threat to
>>>>> Great Britain during World War I turned out to be German U-Boats and
>>>>> their unrestricted warfare against enemy and neutral shipping. It was
>>>>> this that ultimately helped draw the United States into World War I.
>>>>> The above analysis is correct. And I am not particualrly opposed to
>>>>> applying dreadnought to sauropod names. It was the way in which
>>>>> Lacovara et al did so, incl in PR in the science media, that is not in
>>>>> accord with history.
>>>>> Had
>>>>> I reviewed the paper I would have done something about that. And the
>>>>> mass estimates.
>>>>> In a message dated 9/7/14 3:42:44 PM, design@starfleetgames.com writes:
>>>>> << Everybody had battleships before 1906, but they tended to have two
>>>>> or four big guns for long-range pot-luck sniping a lot of medium-sized
>>>>> guns to do the real dirty work up close. The term battleship had
>>>>> actually been in use for centuries and applied to what we moderns call
>>>>> "ships of the line".
>>>>> Nelson called them "Line of Battle Ships" or simply "battleships."
>>>>> There was even a wooden battleshp called Dreadnought in the 1700s.
>>>>> The continuing and steady improvement in gunnery, optics, and other
>>>>> mechanical sciences meant that long-range gunnery had reached the
>>>>> point that it might actually work. Several nations started building a
>>>>> new kind of battleship, the "all-big-gun" battleship. The trick was,
>>>>> nobody knew what one looked like because nobody had ever seen one. The
>>>>> first to start construction was the USS South Carolina and her sister
>>>>> the USS Michigan.
>>>>> Everybody else was starting this new kind of ship, independenty, on
>>>>> their own.
>>>>> Britain, German, Italy, Russia, all had plans in hand or keels on the
>>>>> slipway.
>>>>> The British started HMS Dreadnought somewhat later, but built it much
>>>>> faster, so it was the first all-big-gun-battleship in service.
>>>>> Dreadnought was a very bad design. It had all big guns, but because
>>>>> the British couldn't figure out how to have Turret #2 shoot over
>>>>> Turret #1, only eight of the ten cannons could shoot right or left,
>>>>> and there was not much in the way of internal compartments (another
>>>>> new idea) so a torpedo hit was going to be sudden death overtime. It
>>>>> did have the new kind of modern turbine engines.
>>>>> USS Michigan came out next, and it had four double gun turrets with #2
>>>>> shooting over #1 (on the front) and #3 shooting over #4 (on the back)
>>>>> so with only eight guns it had the same firepower as Dreadnought (8 vs
>>>>> 8). It had internal compartments, turbines, and was superior to
>>>>> Dreadnought in every way, BUT, Dreadnought was first so now
>>>>> "dreadnought" is interchangable with "battleship"
>>>>> when it shouldn't be. HMS Dreadnought was so bad that the British
>>>>> never sent it into battle and quickly copied Michigan. Maybe you'd
>>>>> call it a "loss leader"
>>>>> to "capture the brand name."
>>>>> So now we just need a dinosaur called Michigandus magnificus and we'll
>>>>> be historically accurate.>>
>>>>> I have some disagreements with the above.
>>>>> The predreadnoughts of the late 1890s and very early 1900s generally
>>>>> had two main battery turrets, one fore and one aft, twins mounting 4
>>>>> guns of
>>>>> 11 or
>>>>> 12" bore, with a bunch of 6 or 8" guns astride the superstructure.
>>>>> Athough the main guns were modern rifles able to fire very long
>>>>> ranges, the fire control systems were lacking so battles were intended
>>>>> to be at a few thousand meters, with the possibility of ramming with
>>>>> the ram bows -- but during the Russo-Japanese war the predreadnoughts
>>>>> sometimes banged away at one another at greater ranges. The tubby
>>>>> batships were also slow at about 18 kts.
>>>>> Lord Fischer wanted to markedly increase the power of the battle fleet
>>>>> while keeping costs down, and with the same number of ships. How to do
>>>>> that?
>>>>> Obvious. Double the broadside of heavy guns while not increasing
>>>>> tonnage all that much (already nervous about a radical new design that
>>>>> would obsolesce the predreadnought force, Parliament was not about to
>>>>> pay for much bigger ships), which required getting rid of the
>>>>> intermediate guns. There was also talk of how a large set of all heavy
>>>>> guns would also make long range gunnery possible because their uniform
>>>>> ballistics would allow long range over-under salvo spotting, but the
>>>>> required technology was not yet on hand. Fisher also took the
>>>>> opportunity to do what he liked best and increase speed to 21 kts via
>>>>> the brand new turbines, a concept he took further with the equally big
>>>>> battlecruisers which were not as bad as many think they were.
>>>>> The Dreadnought itself and 6 semi-sister ships had five turrets with
>>>>> two on the wings because that allowed it in principle to fire three
>>>>> turrets forward as the fleet charged -- ram bows generating
>>>>> magnificent bow waves
>>>>> -- at
>>>>> short range directly at the enemy. In reality the blast of the side
>>>>> turrets was so intense that they could only fire broadside, which soon
>>>>> became a problem because only 4 turrets could engage in the preNelson
>>>>> line of battle that the Royal Navy and everyone else readopted in the
>>>>> late 1900s going into the Great War.
>>>>> (The Germans also initially used wing turrets, even more inefficiently
>>>>> in their first dreadnoughts. The RN gradually and awkwardly went
>>>>> superimposed, the Neptunes had one aft, with central turrets actually
>>>>> meant to fire through the superstructure when needed -- kind of crazy
>>>>> but the Invincibles did that at the Falklands to the discomfort of
>>>>> those in the the opposite turrets.
>>>>> They did not remount the sighting hoods on the turrets tops so upper
>>>>> gun sets could not fire straight forward or aft over the lower turrets
>>>>> during WW 1, but they did not care because by then the line of battler
>>>>> was back in vogue.
>>>>> The USN immediately went to efficient superimposed turrets as per the
>>>>> Michigans. )
>>>>> As the war approached systems were developing to allow long range fire
>>>>> under central control, eventually using salvo techniques especially by
>>>>> the Brits
>>>>> - its a very complicated story of competing systems being applied
>>>>> semi-haphazardly to differing vessels at differing times that I have
>>>>> never fully sorted out -- but their whimpy rangefinders reduced their
>>>>> ability to initially find the range. Over all the gunnery was fairly
>>>>> equal at Jutland, Beatty's battlecruisers had initial problems because
>>>>> they were not able to conduct gunnery practise at Rosyth, and also had
>>>>> worse back lighting conditions during the run south. By the end of the
>>>>> war the Grand Fleet had the world's best long range systems, but the
>>>>> problems were not really solved until high frequency, broad scan
>>>>> phased array radars atop the main range finders allowed RN and USN
>>>>> batships to straddle fast moving targets at ranges up the max of 20
>>>>> plus miles (the 3 old batships with the new system immediately
>>>>> straddled the poor Yamashiro at Suriago Straight when they opened fire
>>>>> at 10 miles at night).
>>>>> Of course the 3 Brit batcruisers blew up at Jutland with virtually all
>>>>> crews lost because the RN was using dangeorusly unstable cordite
>>>>> charges (still doing that in 41 when the fast battleship she was NOT a
>>>>> battlecruiser Hood went poof), not because of inadequate armor -- at
>>>>> Dogger Bank, Jutland and the final battle of the Bismarck the Germans
>>>>> were having their turrets taken out by the often heavier RN guns left
>>>>> & right without the ships blowing up because they used a very stable
>>>>> cordite formula that flash burned (killing all in the magazines and
>>>>> turrets, like what happened on the Iowa in 89) rather than immediately
>>>>> exploded. Same for the Americans, so the USS Boise took an AP round in
>>>>> a magazine during a Solomons night battle and stayed in the action
>>>>> with the three forward turrets burned out (that is the other reason
>>>>> that the Arizona's exploding so quickly still has them scratching
>>>>> their heads).
>>>>> Had the Brits who were running an oceanic empire paid proper attention
>>>>> to their ammo, i. e. had stable cordite and AP rounds that actually
>>>>> worked most of the time (the shells were too brittle and the primitive
>>>>> fuses rarely worked), Jutland would have been a significant RN
>>>>> victory, with no major Grand Fleet losses and probably 3-4 High Seas
>>>>> Fleet batcruisers sunk. Oh well.
>>>>> It is correct that the RN, in part because of habitability issues for
>>>>> ships sent to distant empire stations, did not pay sufficient
>>>>> attention to underwater protection, unlike the Germans and Americans.
>>>>> That is why the new super dreadnought Audacious sunk after hitting
>>>>> just one mine, along with inadequate damage control early in the war,
>>>>> and detail problems ("watertight" doors jarred open by the initial
>>>>> shock, etc). But the similar Marlborough took a torpedo in engineering
>>>>> at Jutland and maintained its place in the battle line (we can imagine
>>>>> its Scotty keeping the steam up despite the pressure).
>>>>> The Dreadnought was with the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow until she was
>>>>> assigned with ye old predreadnoughts to defend the Thames outlet. So
>>>>> the Dreadnought herself alas missed the colossal battle of Jutland she
>>>>> inspired. Shortly after that she rejoined the Grand Fleet -- the 6
>>>>> other oldest dreadnoughts in Jellicoe's fleet hardly being different
>>>>> in design. She did ram and sink a pesky sub at one point.
>>>>> As it happens I have a criticism of USN WW 2 torpedoes in the Sunday
>>>>> Washington Post --
>>>>> http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/more-on-alexandrias-torpedo-factor
>>>>> y-and-a-soviet-leader-who-did-shop-at-giant/2014/09/06/b89e43ba-3436-1
>>>>> 1e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
>>>>> GSPaul
>>>>> </HTML>